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Bioethics: a worldview based on analytical psychology

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Abstract

What we understand as ethics, and what generates the discussion on bioethics, is based on the notion of "right" and "wrong" derived from morality or current codes of conduct. These codes often distort the notion of human principles, which, in theory, precede any moralizing model that denies antinomies and paradoxes in science production. Since analytical psychology is one of the areas of knowledge most dedicated to studying the issue of opposites and ambiguities in the human sphere, we benefit from its premises to propose a reflection on a worldview of bioethics that also considers what is denied, hidden, repressed or even unfairly defended in the name of an idea of science. To support our arguments, in addition to reference authors in the field of bioethics, works by Leonardo Boff, Erich Neumann, Adolf Guggenbühl-Craig, and Carl Gustav Jung are used.

Keywords: Bioethics. Worldview. Jungian theory.

Resumo

Bioética: uma cosmovisão a partir da psicologia analítica

Aquilo que entendemos como ética, e que gera a discussão sobre bioética, passa pela noção dos "certos" e dos "errados" oriundos da moral ou códigos de conduta vigentes. Muitas vezes, tais códigos falseiam a noção de princípios humanos, que, em tese, antecedem qualquer modelo moralizante que nega as antinomias e o paradoxal na produção de ciência. Sendo a psicologia analítica uma das áreas do saber que mais se dedicou a estudar a questão dos opostos e das ambiguidades no âmbito humano, nos beneficiamos de suas premissas para propor uma reflexão acerca de uma cosmovisão da bioética que considere também aquilo que é negado, escondido, reprimido, ou até mesmo injustamente defendido em nome de uma ideia de ciência. Para pautar nossos argumentos, além de autores de referência no campo da bioética, utilizamos trabalhos de Leonardo Boff, Erich Neumann, Adolf Guggenbühl-Craig e Carl Gustav Jung.

Palavras-chave: Bioética. Cosmovisão. Teoria junguiana.

Resumen

Bioética: una cosmovisión desde la psicología analítica

Lo que entendemos como ética, y que genera la discusión sobre la bioética, pasa por la noción de lo "correcto" y lo "incorrecto" proveniente de la moral o códigos de conducta vigentes. Muchas veces, tales códigos falsifican la noción de principios humanos que, en teoría, anteceden a cualquier modelo moralizante que niega las antinomias y lo paradójico en la producción de ciencia. Al ser la psicología analítica una de las áreas del saber que más se ha dedicado a estudiar la cuestión de los opuestos y las ambigüedades en el ámbito humano, nos beneficiamos de sus premisas para proponer una reflexión acerca de una cosmovisión de la bioética, que considere también aquello que es negado, escondido, reprimido, o incluso injustamente defendido en nombre de una idea de ciencia. Para basar nuestros argumentos, además de autores de referencia en el campo de la bioética, utilizamos trabajos de Leonardo Boff, Erich Neumann, Adolf Guggenbühl-Craig y Carl Gustav Jung.

Palabras clave: Bioética. Cosmovisión. Teoría junguiana.

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Between the 1930s and 1950s, a Russian physician and scientist , Vladimir Petrovich Demikhov, pioneered several organ transplants between animals [1]. His most remarkable feats were head transplants between dogs [2]. In the 1970s, American physician and neurosurgeon Robert White would make history by performing head transplant between two monkeys [3]. Although the method has some viability, several technical aspects were left unresolved, such as the reconnection of the spinal cord, so the monkeys were paralyzed [1]. In 2016, the controversial Italian neurosurgeon Sergio Canavero promised that in 2017 he would perform the first human head transplant [1], and he already had a volunteer for such procedure, a Russian man with a terminal and degenerative disease [4]. To date, we are unaware whether this has been performed and whether it is actually possible.

If, on the one hand, these experiments shock the common sense about the practice of science, to the point of being considered bizarre, on the other hand, in the long term, we reap their benefits, such as organ transplantation, which currently prolongs human life in a healthy manner. However, regardless of the benefits of such experiments, they are controversial enough to raise our awareness of the ethical issues related to the treatment of diseases (and people!) and the maintenance or prolongation of life. These experiments also invite us to think about a worldview of bioethics, that is, they evoke the consideration (or search) of a comprehensive and integrative perspective that recognizes that the practice of science is not synonymous with "perfection," "state of grace," or "enlightenment." Often, there is pain and suffering, of animals and people (who accept experimental studies that are properly cataloged in the scientific community, but still have uncertain results), and typical uncertainties that are part of the journey of conducting research.

This article proposes a critical reflection on these ambiguities, as its investigative starting point is analytical psychology, which suggests the observation and analysis of human phenomena considering their dualities, paradoxicalities, symbolisms and compensatory aspects involved in the complex interrelation between consciousness and unconsciousness [5,6]. This perspective invites to a symbolic and relativistic reading of bioethics, which ideally should be more than a series of codes of conduct or moralizing principles, but rather the result of the expression of acts in favor of well-being in a broad sense, or according to a worldview, as we prefer to refer to it, and considering that, as they are human actions, they are subject to contradictions, paradoxes and—why not—injustices.

Experiments such as those above rekindle discussions on the notion that bioethics is more typically considered to be ethics related to life and living [7]. However, the so-called principlist bioethics *seeks to solve ethical dilemmas in the field of health* [8], so that social, psychological, spiritual and historical aspects seem to be ignored if it is taken exclusively from this perspective, as criticized by Petra and collaborators.

Can experiments that confront a natural order of things be taken as legitimate? Would these researchers be right? Questions like these open a deep field of reflection on the practice of scientists in the fields of biology and of care professionals (psychology, social care, education and others) regarding the limits of professional practice and research. From the perspective of analytical psychology, we are proposing an expanded and integrative reading, suggesting a worldview of bioethics, based on reflections of Jung [9] on worldview.

Beyond science and health

Revisiting ethics and morals

The definitions of the terms "ethics" and "morals" are confused because they have the same root. *Ethos*, in Greek, means something like "dwelling", but dwelling in a symbolic sense, that which aggregates, which creates the sense of belonging, from which the word "ethics" derives, and in Latin *ethos* was translated as *mos/mores*, which means "habit," "customs," giving rise to the word "morals" [10]. The conceptualizations of both are quite approximate, and for pedagogical purposes we use the definitions of Leonardo Boff, according to which:

ethics is part of philosophy. It considers fundamental conceptions about life, the universe, the human being and their destiny, establishes principles and values that orient persons and

societies. A person is ethical when guided by principles and convictions. We say, then, that they have character and good nature (...). Morals are part of concrete life. They deal with the actual practice of people who express themselves through culturally established customs, habits and values. A person is moral when they act in accordance with the consecrated customs and values. These may eventually be questioned by ethics. A person can be moral (following customs even for convenience), *but not necessarily ethical* (obeying convictions and principles) [11].

What differentiates the two, in a strict sense, is that the first deals with principles and the second is closer to codes of conduct. We assume that principles, or ethics, are (or should be) impersonal, undifferentiated and comprehensive, due to their archetypal character [9,10]. While codes of conduct and morals, despite arising from an archetypal principle, are informed according to cultures and locations, often resulting in broad-spectrum restricting habits and behaviors, as if they were an "adapted," "personalized," "differentiated" ethics.

As a means of establishing fundamental principles:

ethics arises in the history of humanity as a strategy to organize the thought about the adequacy of human living. The ability to question one's own existence is one of the characteristics that enables identifying the human person as such. Ethics, in a systematic and critical manner, reflects on moral intuitions, seeking the justifications that serve as a basis for the moral choices that people make [12].

If ethics suggests the ideal of human principles, it ends up becoming a means of creating new manners to — perhaps even ceasing to be ethics to – normalize the individual, removing intangible aspects such as values and sensibility from the scope of the analysis of the phenomenon, so that:

it became an instrument of normalization of the individual, forced to introject the laws to participate in the dynamics of the social process, laws according to which they are inspected or even punished. Society is founded less on ethics and law than on the legalization of the various personal and social practices officially accepted, without questioning what they serve, if the interests of domination by the established powers, if society that wants to orient itself by the common good and equity [13].

This means that what should be a human principle is at risk of becoming a literalizing code of conduct that aims to hide that there is also a dark character in research, expressed in actions that, within a certain spectrum, are morally repulsive, but in another are naturally accepted because, supposedly, they meet an ideal of "doing good" [14], such as the death penalty practiced in some countries, which is paradoxical in itself, as it grants the State the right to do to a person what it considers the worst of crimes.

Without bringing the antagonisms to light, these ambiguous situations in research (and in society) are subject to the risk of being governed by a sort of dogmatism, most often transmuted into a retrograde morality, as presented by Junges, supposedly conceived within a Cartesian and irrefutable logic in which *moral problems are not mathematical questions, definitively solved with quantitative probabilistic calculations, but paradoxical matters, characterized by a credible and probable approach. To solve them, it is necessary to deliberate, considering all possible means, which need to be weighed and balanced* [15].

Still on the subject, the same author states that putting a mathematical system and a value system in comparative order is fallacious, as they are not comparable; an integrative ethical system must come out of this type of fallacious comparison, as *the dilemmatic fallacy arises when ethics is conceived from a more geometric* [rationalist, Cartesian] *model and from a logical and ideological perspective of opposing positions. Since the Greeks, moral knowledge and its corresponding practice have always dealt with contingent issues, about which there are no absolute certainties* [16]. This fosters discussions in the fields of ethics and bioethics on issues that are still very important to society, such as the death penalty, legalization of abortion, assisted death, prolongation of life, genetic selection, and sexual rights, among others that are not limited to a perspective exclusively focused on health [8].

Assuming the rigid model, the discussions about the production of science and the ethics of

scientists become biased, framed in a dominant moral order, placed within the limited structure of the Enlightenment ideal, which only considers as science that which can be measured, weighed or touched; it is hard science, whose conception disregards psychic, symbolic, social and spiritual aspects, given that *we come from a civilizing experiment, now globalized, which has accomplished extraordinary things, but which is materialistic and mechanical, linear and deterministic, dualistic and reductionist, atomized and compartmentalized. It separated matter and spirit, science and life, economics and politics, God and the world* [17]. As a result, values and commitments to life are neglected.

Jung [18] agrees with this perspective, noting that contemporary science predominantly considers two of the four functions of consciousness: the thought function, which analyzes facts qualitatively and quantitatively, and the sensation function, which builds models based on an ordering and sequencing. Thus, the other two functions, which are the feeling function, which analyzes the world sensibly, through a system of non-measurable and non-tangible values, and the intuition function, which creates connections with possibilities initially considered illogical and somewhat chaotic, are neglected, as if they were "enemies" of the thought and sensation functions. According to the author:

since our current scientific spirit is unilaterally concrete-empirical, it does not know how to appreciate the action of the one who presents the idea, for facts are more important to it than knowledge in primitive forms, which the human mind understands. The inclination towards the side of concretism is a relatively new achievement, dating back to the time of the Enlightenment. The results of this development are admirable, but have led to an accumulation of empirical material whose quantity has gradually caused more confusion than clarity. Inevitable was the rise of a scientific separatism and, with it, of a mythology of specialists that meant the death of universality. The preponderance of empiricism does not only mean the suppression of active thinking, but also a danger to the creation of theories within a discipline. The absence of general viewpoints favors the appearance of mythical theories, as much as the absence of empirical viewpoints [19].

And, thus, unilateral views of the phenomenon thrive. The researches of Goldim [7] corroborate the viewpoints of Boff [10] and Jung [18] as they reflect that the physician's practice should not be informed only by objective criteria. He states that *the traditional perspective based predominantly on the physician's practice should be expanded to a broader reflection on health issues, including the associated social aspects* [20]. We can extend this perspective to all people who work in human research and to all people whose professional practice is in the fields of human care. Hence Goldim saying that Potter *questioned whether the possibility of survival of humanity itself would not depend on an interdisciplinary ethical reflection—which he called bioethics-that could serve as a 'bridge to the future'* [21].

It is from this "uneasiness," or need to understand scientific practice towards life, that bioethics arises as a field of knowledge, which should be the ethical commitment towards life, considering a worldview, beyond the "monotheism" of reason and unilateral perspectives of consciousness. According *to Goldim, bioethics can be understood as a complex, interdisciplinary and shared reflection on the appropriateness of actions involving life and living* [22]. Its occupation is to establish and discuss the limits of practice in the field of health; however, its amplitude varies according to the regions of the world. According to the same author:

the bioethical reflection on issues in the fields of health and the environment has expanded and deepened in different places around the world. Europe has seen the rise of different perspectives to approach health issues. In Australia, discussions on issues involving the use of animals in research and even in food have had major repercussion. In Latin America, discussions on access to health care systems, poverty and environmental preservation were associated with major globally discussed issues, such as privacy, transplants, assisted reproduction, euthanasia and assisted suicide [23].

Currently, bioethics continues to be discussed with regard to its scope and limits, as well as its areas of activity [7,8,15]. In addition, the issues emerge as required by the spirit of the time. With the advancement of technology, the way of living and facing life has undergone changes,

evoking new discussions in bioethics that contemplate other areas of knowledge, so that *bioethics, seen beyond clinical ethical dilemmas, addresses environmental, animal, work, and science ethics, among other issues. As an open field to discuss the relationships between sentient beings (but not only), fundamental issues that represent contemporary crises of monumental proportions can and should be approached interdisciplinarily* [24].

Therefore, we require a worldview of bioethics, for, as argued by Jung:

one can be the commander of one's own army and successfully wage the struggle for existence inside and outside oneself, and even reach a relatively secure state of peace, without possessing a conscious worldview. But one cannot do it without an attitude. We can only truly speak of worldview when someone formulates their attitude conceptually or concretely and clearly verifies for what reason and for what purpose they live and act in this or that manner [25].

This implies accountability as to the limits of bioethics, both with regard to the fields of knowledge encompassed in its principles and the ethical meaning and significance of scientific practice, considering ethics in the terms propounded above.

Bioethics, technology and genetics

The famous astrophysicist Stephen Hawking (1942–2018) most likely would not have lived for 76 years if he had been born in the 18th or 19th century. However, technology enabled him to live a long life, with relative quality of life, and to be an active scientist, acknowledged globally for his studies. To that end, he used resources such as an eye movement reader, which enabled him to "write" his sentences, which were reproduced in audio through artificial intelligence.

In 2023, there was a widely disseminated news story about a 45-year-old billionaire man who had been using his fortune to invest in research to make him "young forever" [26]. According to the report, he ingests 54 pills daily, and does not want to undergo any aesthetic procedure, as he hopes to achieve the desired results of his "youth" using only supplements and pills resulting from the research he sponsors. According to him, he *has the heart of a 37-year-old, the skin of a 28-year-old, and the lung capacity of an 18-year-old* [27].

Thus, we have two situations: one in which technological resources have prolonged the life of those with a serious illness – which does not mean bluntly stating that this is "right" or "wrong"; and another in which a person wants to prolong their own life for some not very clear reason. Vanity? We do not know. However, Boff helps us consider this issue fondly by stating that *the universe has worked for 15 billion years and biogenesis for 3.8 billion years to order the information that guarantees life and its balance. We, in one generation, already want to control these very complex processes, without measuring the consequences of our actions* [28].

The use of technology in research can be of great value and act in the service of life. In this sense, bioethics serves as a parameter to discuss the limits of human research so that it is not just reflections of egoic inflations [29], which, in the terms of analytical psychology, would be something like "playing God." Technology also arises—supposedly—as an ally in decision-making processes. Junges, in his study on dilemmas in bioethics, demonstrates that there is progress in the quantification and algorithmization of decision-making processes and says that:

decisionist theory is founded on the premise of choice as a rational process that follows utilitarian reasoning to select the best alternative with quantifiable results, considering the probability of occurrence and the degree of desiderability. The two central elements of every decision—facts (results) *and values* (desiderability)*—are expressed in probabilistic and graduation numbers. This rational view was introduced into medicine as a methodology for clinical reasoning decisions. Evidence-based medicine deepens and refines this reasoning. The quantitative support of the decision-making process is being expanded and complexified with the use of big data in health care and the respective algorithmization of decision-making* [30].

This would be a kind of technologization of the choice of what to do or not to do, which ignores at least one fundamental aspect of consciousness,

which is the value chain (or, for Jung [18], the feeling function), which contemplates the search for a sensibility, which, *a priori*, no artificial intelligence or mathematical formula has been able to express creatively—at most, they can achieve an emulation of sensibility by combining data.

Technology has also been an important ally in genetics research, which, despite aiming to anticipate and seek the cure of diseases, can acquire an interventionist character, as in selecting the sex of embryos—an eminently illegal, but not impossible practice. There is also discussions on the ethical aspect of optional mastectomy in women with the breast cancer gene, even though there is no guarantee that it will develop. We are not arguing here in favor of this or that, but only shedding light on increasingly normalized phenomena, ignored in their shadows, whose consequences for life (not only human, but for life in a broad sense) in the long term may still be unknown.

Perhaps Greek mythology helps us metaphorically with the *metron*, the fair measure. Boff makes an important reflection in this regard by saying that:

if we look closely, the fair measure is the secret formula by which the universe was organized and it has ensured its balance to this day. If, after the big bang, the expansion forces had not been contained by gravitational energy, all the elements would have diffused until they were diluted in infinite space. So there would not have been the condensation of gases, the formation of stars, planets, Earth and we would not be here to reflect on all this. If gravitational force had predominated and if the materials had all come back upon themselves, they would have exploded in successive chains and the universe and we would not have arisen. But, on the contrary, everything proceeded in the fair measure. A dynamic and subtle balance was established between expansion and condensation, so that dense bodies, living beings and complex beings such as animals and ourselves could arise [31].

As paradoxical as it may seem, the combination of science and technology should bring to the conversation the field of spirituality or the sacred, to consider "psycho-spiritually" what is behind the incessant pursuit of "perfection"—would it be an abstraction of the alchemical process, in which alchemists pursued perfect matter? [5,6] We do not know. Boff argues that *the body of geneticists must enter the laboratory of experimentation as one enters a temple and operate processes as one does a liturgy. Otherwise, they may endanger the future of life. Life is not a commodity. Therefore, research is not directed to profit, but to the improvement of life itself* [32].

According to Goldim, *with the advancement of science, new challenges were introduced. The expansion of scientific knowledge and the impact of its technological transposition have led to the need to evaluate how far we can go* [33]. Based on that, Boff establishes the following question: *in the field of biotechnology we need to ask ourselves: what is the fair measure in the manipulation of the human genetic code?* [34] This question opens space for another relevant discussion, which is the use of power to the detriment of the use of serving in human research and in professional activities that aim at the care of human beings.

Professions of care and power

Adolf Guggenbühl-Craig [35] conducted a fruitful debate, in the light of analytical psychology, about the power in care professions. Although his reflections are not specifically oriented toward a worldview of bioethics, we can bring his considerations closer to the matter in question. One of the points addressed by the author is quackery. He says that:

quackery is a type of shadow that permanently accompanies physicians. It is one of their dark brothers and as such can live inside or outside them. Some physicians see this shadow only in the person of an obscure healer, but the fact is that, for the most part, they end up themselves becoming victims of the quack shadow in the course of their professional activities [36].

Let us think here not about literal quackery, but symbolic quackery. In other words, although a particular experiment or technique demonstrates a "practical result," what is in its shadow? What does this revelation sublimate from that which is unrevealed? Jung teaches us that the shadow is always present [5,6]; therefore, a genuine and human discussion about bioethics must also contemplate its shadow [15]. An example of what we

mean is the so-called electroconvulsive therapy, formerly also called, and popularly known as, electroshock therapy. If, on the one hand, there are cases that demonstrate improvements in relation to deep depressions [37]; on the other hand, the question of whether it would be therapy or torture still resonates. Do the gains legitimize the process? Answering that "yes" only by resorting to a statistical graph seems like symbolic quackery to us.

The solution for such dilemma seems to begin with dialectics, otherwise it would become an attempt at convincement or fight for power, as:

in a human relationship one subject confronts another. Each relates to the other as a subject. In a relationship in which power is the dominant factor, one tries to transform the other into an object, subjecting the latter to the former. That is, the object starts to be manipulated by the subject according to their own interests. This type of situation emphasizes the subject's notion of their own importance and exempts the object from any responsibility. There we have a kind of power. Another variety is 'self-deification.' Only God, or the gods, have the right to dominate men. A human being possessed by a 'god complex' tries, as a god, to dominate others. This type of power has a numinous quality and is extremely dangerous to both the dominator and the dominated [38].

The idea of prudence or "common sense" could also be considered; however, there are situations where diverse power structures are in conflict and only a creative solution could resolve it. Junges exemplifies this scenario when he compares a situation in which a religious dogmatic belief is confronted with a vital situation in a way that:

the dilemmatic fallacy prevents this prudential consideration, as it analyzes ethically conflictual situations based on antagonistic references: for example, autonomy or beneficence in the case of blood transfusion and sacredness or quality of life in end-of-life cases. Being based on this opposition to solve the case is a fallacy of analysis because it prevents considering intermediate solutions, more appropriate to the context [39].

Although this situation seems obvious if considered unilaterally according to the "monotheism" of reason, it is not so for those who profess a certain belief or faith.

In terms of decision-making, Junges proposes an alternative, called "deliberative model," which considers the context from different perspectives. The author says that *this is the advantage of the* [deliberative] *model, which is not primarily focused on decision, but on deliberation, not eliminating a priori any course to solution and propounding the different paths for discussion. Thus, the method has a problematic perspective, avoiding the dilemmatic fallacy* [40]. In the narrative it seems interesting, but in practice there is no guarantee that it will work. Considering today's hegemonic thought, would we achieve a deliberation that deeply considered biological, psychological, sociological, political and spiritual aspects? It does not seem so. Let us remember the *hybris*, the arrogance, or the "playing God," which, in archetypal terms, always leads to human ruin, for:

the law, according to which, in mythology, the hybris of man is punished by the vengeance of the gods and the fall caused by it, is the projection of a psychological law. All inflation, all identification of the ego with a superpersonal content—and such is the meaning of hybris, in which man imagines himself equal to the gods—leads to ruin, in which the impersonal content, the gods annihilate the ego that is not able to recognize that their power is superior [41].

Let us remember the famous and paradoxically infamous former doctor Roger Abdelmassih, considered one of the best specialists in human reproduction in Brazil, now sentenced to years in prison for serial rape. Analytical psychology helps us to consider and problematize similar situations involving bioethics as it proposes a non-unilateral approach, reducing the possibility of thinking of ourselves as "gods," due to its own proposition of science, as, according to Jung:

analytical psychology is a reaction against an exaggerated rationalization of consciousness that, in the concern to produce oriented processes, isolates itself from nature and, thus, deprives man of his natural history and transposes him

to a rationally limited present that consists in a short time space between birth and death. This limitation generates in the individual the feeling that they are a random and meaningless creature, and this feeling prevents us from living life with the intensity required so one can live life to the full extent. Life then becomes insipid and no longer represents man in his totality. That is why so many unlived lives fall under the dominion of the unconscious [42].

This implies admitting that Cartesian rationalism does not always offer enough argument to observe a phenomenon and make decisions about it. If that were the case, any crime against humanity could be legitimized on the grounds of the results achieved, as in the example of the scientific experiments—tortures?—carried out by the Nazis against the Jews in World War II.

Still on power, there is another even more controversial perspective, which is that which the subject has (or does not have) of themself when deciding the moment to interrupt their own life, despite the natural biological course, as we will comment below.

Human dignity and assisted dying

In the Spanish film *Mar adentro*, based on real events, the protagonist opens a political, human and ethical discussion about euthanasia, incited by himself after suffering a serious accident and becoming quadriplegic. He argues that in his state he was just a living being, without any possibility of social contribution. We can argue otherwise using the aforementioned example of Stephen Hawking, who made his illness a means of development for new technologies. However, arguing unilaterally in favor of one side or the other is also to fall into a dilemmatic fallacy, for the discussion of "right" or "wrong" bypasses a rationalist comparative decision. We cannot personally experience the lives of the aforementioned subjects, which is why discussions about the end of life still lack much depth.

In the examples above, both individuals had a certain awareness that enabled them to decide on their own life; however, that is not always the case [43]. In practical terms, *technological development has enabled interventions that, by postponing death, evoke ethical debates and questions about conducts that subject patients to unnecessary and undesirable suffering* [44]. Several people suffer from illnesses that will not even let them consciously decide about their life. Accordingly, new terms were coined to indicate the processes of dying [45]. Especially for terminal patients in ICUs, *there are three possible paths: euthanasia, dysthanasia and orthothanasia* [46]. Let us see the meaning of each of these "-thanasias,", which are terms derived from the Greek word *Thanatos*, the god of death. Briefly, euthanasia is the conscious choice to interrupt one's own life, whereas dysthanasia *is the attempt to maintain life at any cost, with disproportionate medical acts that make death more difficult* [45,47]. In turn, orthothanasia refers to death at the right time; with *the search for conceptual precision, several bioethicists, including Gafo (Spain), use the term orthothanasia to refer to 'death at its right time.' As the Greek prefix ortho means' correct,' orthothanasia has the meaning of 'death at its time ', without disproportionate abbreviation or prolongation of the dying process* [48]. In addition to these three, there is mysthanasia, a *term derived from Greek (mys = unhappy; thanathos = death; 'unhappy death'), that is, miserable, early and preventable death* [49].

We still lack much discussion about assisted dying or palliative care, but especially about euthanasia; we cannot measure its symbolic relevance to the psyche. To this end, we present a reflection on abortion by Leon Bonaventure, who says that *abortion, in itself, does not exist. What exists are people who have abortions in certain circumstances, for a variety of reasons. They are people with certain living conditions, age, levels of consciousness development and different inner states, with their always unique life stories, and that is why it is so dangerous to generalize and judge* [50]. Assuming that euthanasia is an "abortion" against oneself, it seems to us that Bonaventure's reflection is quite appropriate, at least for those who "stay." Still on abortion, the author adds that *such conduct requires psychological maturity at the level of consciousness and meaning, and this cannot be required from everyone and at all times* [51]. This is valid for those who want to "abort"

themselves. We must, again, bring Bonaventure's uncomfortable and controversial proposition to the center of the debate—have we been able to conclusively achieve a worldview of euthanasia? In more practical terms, Cano and collaborators [43] suggest that, in bioethical decisions, psychosocial factors should be considered, and not just medico-legalistic premises. We add to them the spiritual and symbolic dimensions, such as presented by Boff [10].

Worldview and bioethics

A basic premise, based on Jung, is that science should serve life and well-being, and not interfere with them. That is why we conclude our considerations by addressing studies by two relevant authors, Willian Irwin Thompson [52], who makes the claim of a biopolitics (and consequent bioethics) in favor of Gaia, planet Earth, and Erich Neumann [14], who makes a relevant reflection on ethics in the scope of analytical psychology.

Thompson says that *if we look attentively around us, we can see the return of catastrophism to artistic and scientific narratives. My impression is that this means that the deepest foundations of industrial society are giving and* (...) *we are faced with a new view of the planetary dynamics, a view of sudden discontinuities* [53].

Boff adds that:

no one can today to tell us where humanity is headed toward: whether toward an abyss, which will engulf everyone, or toward a culmination, which will encompass everyone. What is certain is that we are entering a new level of consciousness, the planetary consciousness, and that we feel the urgency of an alliance between the peoples who find themselves together within the only Common Home [Gaia], *so they can live together in a minimally peaceful manner, and that special care for the Earth and its ecosystems is necessary, otherwise we will lose the foundations of our subsistence* [54].

If we are "depleting" the Earth's resources, we need to think of a bioethics that dignifies it; hence the importance of a worldview that contemplates paradoxes with dedication. In planetary terms, human life has no more or less value than that of another living being. Our challenge is to propose a bioethics in which human intelligence serves to reintegrate humanity with the planet, and not in the fantasy of sovereignty over it, as Neumann warns us when saying that:

modernity is the era of humanity in which science and technique demonstrate the capacity of consciousness to deal with physical nature and to dominate it on a large scale, to a greater extent than any other era in human history. It is also the period in which the inability to deal with the psychic nature, the human soul, is manifested as terrible as never before [55].

Let us take here the term "human soul" also as the soul of the world, that is, that factor that, although intangible, is known to be present; it is human vitality in harmony with the vitality of the Earth. According to the same author, *the old ethics* [or bioethics], *psychologically speaking, is a 'partial ethics.' It is an ethics of the conscious attitude, failing to consider and evaluate the tendencies and effects on the unconscious* [56]. In other words, it is a bioethics that denies its own shadow, as we have discussed above.

The solution proposed by Neumann is the construction of a new ethics, which is one that considers polarities, escaping from the monotheism of reason, as *the new ethics rejects the dominance of a partial structure of personality and fosters the total personality as a basis for ethical behavior. Founding ethics through the shadow is as unilateral as a tendency that is oriented only by the values of the ego* [57], that is, values that meet an idea of normalization that ignores the ambiguous and the paradoxical.

Also according to the author:

The most important task of the new ethics is to produce an integration, its first purpose is to make integrable the parts that are dissociated and hostile to the life system of the individual [and society]. *The juxtaposition of contrasts, which fills the entire experienceable world, should no longer be solved by victory on the one side and repression on the other side, but only by the synthesis of opposites* [58].

Finally, let us recall Jung's warning about the intellect's place in the world when not confronted by biases other than the very reality he fabricated:

the intellect remains imprisoned in itself as long as it does not voluntarily renounce its supremacy, recognizing the value of other purposes. It is afraid to take the step that forces it out of itself and that denies its universal validity, since, from its point of view, everything else is mere fantasy. But, has anything of real importance come into existence without having being, first, fantasy? [59]

Thus, it is clear that both the creative and falsified qualities of the intellect come from the same fantasy-producing wellspring of the human psyche that generates values, principles, the ability to symbolize, the experience of faith and others. The question remains as to which fantasy we want to live. In other words, if bioethics is considered solely according to logical-Cartesian, moral and normotic principles, it will be fatally denying the dark aspects, considering life as an algebraic equation, dissonant from an integrative worldview.

In this regard, Thompson notes that, *through the spirit, the world has always been one; and now, through electronic technology, the world has learned again to see itself as a unit. However, we still lack a politics that follows our spirituality, art, science or technology. And this seems to be the task tailored for our generation* [60]. Therefore, there is a patent need for a worldview of bioethics that considers the phenomenon in a broad spectrum, in both the associated conscious and unconscious factors.

Final considerations

Science, research and bioethics must be in favor of life, rather than in favor of the control of life. However, this is a concerning challenge. Currently, almost everything obeys a certain hegemonic power from the economic point of view, which denies fantasy, intuition, and the symbolic. We should propose a new worldview of bioethics that enables a creative confrontation of opinions beyond calculations and codes, lest we become automatons, "hostages" of the algorithms we create ourselves, granting them the ability to think for us. Perhaps we had best still keep our heads in their places of origin!

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